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STARE DECISIS AND THE IDENTITY-
OVER-TIME PROBLEM: A COMMENT ON 




In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court recently confronted whether to overrule the 
doctrine under which courts defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own ambiguous 
regulations—so-called Auer or Seminole Rock deference. In its prior reexaminations of 
Seminole Rock, the Court had progressively restricted the doctrine’s scope, leading 
observers to wonder whether the Justices would scrap it for good. This question of 
administrative law ignited a corollary debate about stare decisis. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kagan argued that stare decisis mandated the preservation of Seminole Rock. Yet 
as she appealed to stare decisis, her opinion further restricted the conditions under which 
deference applies. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Gorsuch contended that the majority 
was wrong to invoke stare decisis while simultaneously modifying the doctrine in basic 
respects. Preservation of precedent, in his view, was inconsistent with its continued 
modification. Embedded in Justice Gorsuch’s opinion was a deep question about identity 
over time: If a precedent is heavily modified through subsequent case law, may the final 
case “reaffirming” and further modifying the precedent justifiably trace its lineage to the 
original case announcing the principle, such that the principle’s supposed “antiquity” lends 
it enhanced stare decisis weight? This Article, extending Justice Gorsuch’s critique, answers 
in the negative. Continuous and profound modification of a precedent casts doubt on the 
quality of the Court’s original reasoning and erodes the connection between earlier and later 
cases, thus weakening the stare decisis weight due the precedent upon its reconsideration. 
INTRODUCTION 
A well-worn thought experiment in metaphysics goes something like this: To 
 
 * J.D. Virginia, 2020; M. St. Oxford, 2017; B.A. Vanderbilt, 2016. Special thanks to Justin 
Aimonetti and Professor Frederick Schauer for helpful conversations and insights. All views and any 
errors are my own. 
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honor the achievements of Theseus, founder and king of Athens, the Athenians 
decided to preserve his warship in the Athenian harbor as a floating memorial. As 
some of the ship’s planks began to rot away, the Athenians replaced them with 
“new and stronger timber.”1 Over many years, this process continued such that 
the ship eventually contained none of its original components, yet was still 
recognizable as the original. Was this ship still the “ship of Theseus”?2 Or did the 
Athenians’ progressive rebuilding erase its former identity? These questions have 
no “solution” per se.3 Rather, they serve as an acid test for how philosophers 
conceptualize identity over time. One’s answer might depend upon intuitions 
about whether “identity” is tantamount to form, function, constitution from 
certain elements, or some combination of all three.4 
During the Supreme Court’s last two terms, a roughly analogous dispute has 
developed among the Justices about the proper conception of the doctrine of stare 
decisis.5 Stare decisis counsels that the Court, rehearing an issue at Time Two, 
should not disturb its decision at Time One unless some compelling reason has 
arisen in the interim that casts the Time One precedent into significant doubt.6 
Buried within this maxim is a crucial but often unrecognized question about the 
nature of precedential identity. To “reaffirm” a precedent implies that the 
precedent promulgated at Time Two is materially the same as was announced at 
Time One. Yet is it always the case that such identity has persisted over time? 
In certain cases, the answer is clearly “yes.” In the absence of modification to a 
precedent, the precedent at Time Two is the same as at Time One, and thus may 
justifiably trace its lineage to the Time One decision. But imagine, instead, the 
following scenario: At Time One, the Court decides Smith v. Jones. At Time Two, 
the Court relitigates the issue, purports to “reaffirm” Smith, yet modifies the rule 
that case stood for in certain key respects. At Time Three, the Court relitigates 
the issue again, again purporting to “reaffirm” the (now-modified) Smith, but it 
reconfigures the precedent even further. Finally, at Time Four, the Court is asked 
to “reaffirm” Smith with even more updates and alterations. The precedent for 
which the Smith line of cases stands now bears only scant relation to the contours 
 
 1. PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES 34 (A.H. Clough, ed., John Dryden trans., Little Brown & 
Co. 1906). 
 2. Andre Gallois, Identity Over Time, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/ [https://perma.cc/3UP5-CLZZ]. 
 3. Id. (discussing many of the proposed solutions and various complications with each). 
 4. Id. For a representative disagreement, compare S. Marc Cohen, Identity, Persistence, and the 
Ship of Theseus, U. WASH. DEP’T OF PHIL. (Oct. 6, 2004), 
https://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/theseus.html [https://perma.cc/6RJJ-E7RS] (arguing 
for the coincidence of Theseus’s ship and its “original pieces”), with Mark Johnston, Constitution Is 
Not Identity, 101 MIND 89, 104 (1992) (“[T]here are systematic reasons to distinguish objects from 
the matter which constitutes them.”). 
 5. See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Supreme Court Precedent, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Oct. 2, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/10/scotus-for-law-students-supreme-
court-precedent/ [https://perma.cc/94X7-9XG5]. 
 6. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455–56 (2015) (“[I]t is not alone 
sufficient that we would decide a case differently now than we did then. To reverse course, we require 
as well what we have termed a ‘special justification’—over and above the belief ‘that the precedent 
was wrongly decided.’”) (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 
(2014)). 
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of the original Smith decision. Despite this, should the party opposing 
reaffirmance have to persuade the Court on the merits and overcome the 
additional hurdle of stare decisis? 
Justice Kagan’s answer to this question in her opinion for the Court in Kisor v. 
Wilkie was “yes.”7 Kisor concerned whether the Court should overturn the 
doctrine under which courts defer to administrative agencies’ interpretations of 
their own ambiguous regulations.8 First announced in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co.,9 this doctrine was famously reaffirmed in Auer v. Robbins10 and 
subsequent cases.11 Though Justice Kagan believed petitioner Kisor had lost the 
argument for overturning the deference regime on the merits,12 it was stare 
decisis—“the special care we take to preserve our precedents”13—that drove a stake 
through the heart of his case.14 After her investigation of Seminole Rock’s validity, 
Justice Kagan detailed the reasons stare decisis supported upholding a heavily 
modified version of that regime;15 a version that, as this Article contends, bore 
only questionable resemblance to the original deference principle outlined in 
Seminole Rock. 
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in the judgment, by contrast, disputed that stare 
decisis lent much support to retaining Seminole Rock.16 Considering several of the 
factors the Court uses to assess the weight of stare decisis, Justice Gorsuch argued 
that it represents a mere judge-made doctrine, that the doctrine has engendered 
“no serious reliance interests,” and that it lacks any “persuasive rationale.”17 This 
Article, in particular, focuses on his contention about identity over time. Justice 
Gorsuch accused the majority of “reshaping our precedent in new and 
experimental ways,”18 so “freely . . . remodel[ing]” Seminole Rock that the resultant, 
novel regime was undeserving of stare decisis.19 So extensive was this doctrinal 
 
 7. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414–18, 2422 (2019) (restating and explicitly modifying 
aspects of Seminole Rock/Auer doctrine, yet indicating the petitioner would also have to overcome 
stare decisis to topple the deference regime). 
 8. Id. at 2408 (“This Court has often deferred to agencies’ reasonable readings of genuinely 
ambiguous regulations. We call that practice Auer deference, or sometimes Seminole Rock deference, 
after two cases in which we employed it. The only question presented here is whether we should 
overrule those decisions, discarding the deference they give to agencies.”) (citations omitted). 
 9. 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
 10. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 11. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 601 (2013); see also id. at 616–17 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the respondent had asked the Court 
to “reconsider Auer” and disagreeing with the majority’s decision not to). Justice Scalia, the author of 
the Auer decision, later vociferously disowned his own opinion. See id. at 616–21 (castigating Auer 
deference as invalid and lacking “persuasive justification”). 
 12. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (“Kisor’s last [merits] argument to dispatch Auer deference fails as 
roundly as the rest.”). 
 13. Id. at 2418. 
 14. Id. at 2422 (“If all that were not enough, stare decisis cuts strongly against Kisor’s position.”). 
 15. Id. at 2423. For the majority’s modifications in Kisor to the Auer/Seminole Rock deference 
regime, see id. at 2414–18; see also infra Part II (cataloguing Kisor’s reconfiguration of Seminole Rock 
deference). For Justice Kagan’s stare decisis-based defense of Auer and Seminole Rock, see Kisor, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2422. 
 16. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2443–47 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 17. Id. at 2445, 2447. 
 18. Id. at 2443. 
 19. Id. at 2445. 
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“overhaul,”20 in his opinion, that it rendered the majority’s purported reliance on 
stare decisis not merely wrong, but insincere.21 
Not content to let these fault lines lie, Justices Kagan and Gorsuch debated the 
point again at the oral argument for Ramos v. Louisiana.22 In Ramos, the State of 
Louisiana urged the Court to reaffirm a 1972 precedent23 under stare decisis24 as 
it simultaneously asked the Court to modify that precedent in key respects.25 
Justice Kagan asked Ramos’s counsel whether it was really the case that “a decision 
is entitled to less stare decisis effect because the parties have come into Court and 
tried to kind of improve the reasoning . . . of the earlier decision,” stating that she 
had “never liked that argument.”26 Justice Gorsuch shot back a few minutes later, 
extracting the concession from Louisiana’s counsel that the State’s requested 
modifications confounded its arguments about stare decisis, permitting the Court 
to take up the issue “afresh.”27 
The acrimony of the dispute in Kisor, its resurfacing in Ramos, and the increased 
attention afforded to stare decisis as observers question the longevity of 
controversial precedents,28 all suggest that we have not heard the last of the 
identity-over-time debate. In the context of Kisor and the persistence of Seminole 
Rock, this Article does not feign to settle whether Seminole Rock is constitutional, 
consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), or even wise policy. 
Instead, it contends that Justice Gorsuch had the upper hand in Kisor’s identity-
over-time debate and that the majority was therefore wrong to invoke stare decisis 
as a compelling argument for the retention of Seminole Rock. 
This Article presents that thesis in three sections. Part I provides a brief 
historical overview of the important cases—culminating with Kisor—that shaped 
Seminole Rock deference, illustrating the fluid and contingent nature of that 
doctrine over time. Part II analyzes why those modifications, as Justice Gorsuch 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 2425 (“[T]he doctrine emerges maimed and enfeebled—in truth, zombified. . . . All to 
what end? So that we may pretend to abide stare decisis?”); id. at 2443 (“While pretending to bow to 
stare decisis, the majority goes about reshaping our precedent in new and experimental ways.”). 
 22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–37, Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (No. 
18-5924). 
 23. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Apodaca involved an odd 4–1–4 split in which 
the four-Justice plurality concluded the Sixth Amendment did not require unanimous jury verdicts 
in felony criminal cases, while the four Justices in dissent concluded it did. Id. at 411–12, 414. Justice 
Powell’s concurrence agreed with the dissenters that there was a right to unanimity, but he believed 
such a right was not incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson v. 
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). The result was a requirement of 
unanimity in federal felony convictions, but not in state felony convictions. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 
411–12. The Supreme Court recently overturned this result in Ramos, holding that the Sixth 
Amendment’s requirement of unanimity in felony convictions applies in both state and federal court. 
See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397. 
 24. Brief in Opposition at 3–6, Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (No. 18-5924) (“The doctrine of stare 
decisis counsels against overruling Apodaca v. Oregon.”). 
 25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (No. 18-5924) (Louisiana’s 
counsel arguing that “nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Sixth Amendment requires 
unanimous jury verdicts”). 
 26. Id. at 29. 
 27. Id. at 36–37. 
 28. See infra Conclusion. 
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contended, undermined the stare decisis-based arguments for the retention of 
Seminole Rock. Finally, the Conclusion highlights other precedents susceptible to 
the identity-over-time objection, suggesting that the arguments developed in Kisor 
are likely to soon reappear. 
I.  THE DEEP CONTINGENCY OF THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINE 
The idea of deferring to agency interpretations of agency regulations did not 
enter the world fully formed. Rather, it emerged through a process of common 
law adjudication at the Supreme Court in the latter twentieth century. Though 
some have traced the principle’s roots even deeper,29 its watershed modern 
statement came in the Supreme Court’s aforementioned 1945 decision, Seminole 
Rock.30 
Seminole Rock involved a dispute about whether wartime price controls capping 
prices to the “highest price charged during March 1942” applied to a specific sale 
of crushed stone to a government contractor.31 In October 1941, Seminole Rock 
contracted to furnish a private company crushed stone at $0.60 per ton, and 
delivered that stone in March 1942.32 In January 1942, in a separate transaction, 
it agreed to furnish a government contractor crushed stone at $1.50 per ton, 
which it delivered in August 1942.33 Upon discovering the first sale, the 
government argued that Seminole Rock should have charged it only $0.60 per 
ton.34 It claimed that the delivery of stone in March 1942 at $0.60 per ton 
represented the price Seminole Rock had “charged” for the transaction, even if 
the contract had been signed months before.35 Thus, in the government’s view, 
the regulation capped prices at March 1942’s $0.60 per ton.36 Seminole Rock 
countered that a “charge” in March 1942 would have required both delivery and 
the initial contracting.37 
After an independent analysis of the regulation at issue, the Court concluded 
that the government’s interpretation was superior.38 Curiously, however, the 
Court went further, declaring without citation that “the ultimate criterion is the 
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”39 Pursuant to this 
apparently bespoke principle, the Court pointed to a bulletin issued by the Office 
of Price Administration explaining that “actual delivery during March” was 
 
 29. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–24, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 
18-15) (Justice Sotomayor arguing that a Seminole Rock/Auer-like principle could be traced to case law 
from the nineteenth century). 
 30. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 88 
(2018) (describing Seminole Rock as the doctrine’s “originating case”). 
 31. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945). 
 32. Id. at 412. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 415. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 415–17. 
 39. Id. at 414. 
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dispositive of price, regardless of the date of contracting.40 The Court claimed that 
this declaration removed “[a]ny doubts” about its foregoing, independent 
construction of the regulation.41 
For many years, the significance of this “controlling weight” language was 
uncertain.42 On the one hand, the Court had put forth a muscular declaration 
that administrative interpretations were “of controlling weight unless . . . plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”43 The Court hinted at no 
conditions precedent that would have to be satisfied for this robust deference 
doctrine to apply.44 If taken literally, it represented a broad grant of deference to 
agency interpretations of agency regulations. On the other hand, few agencies at 
the time “engage[d] in rulemaking and even fewer . . . asked . . . for deference” to 
their regulatory interpretations.45 Mid-century administrative law professors 
expressed uncertainty about whether Seminole Rock’s deference principle was to 
“be taken at face value,”46 and pointed out that the Court’s directive to consult 
agency interpretations was “hardly more than dictum.”47 Indeed, the Court had 
independently concluded the government’s interpretation was correct through 
ordinary interpretive methods.48 
Perhaps indicative of the case’s original obscurity, the Supreme Court did not 
cite its “controlling weight” language until 196549—a full two decades later—in 
Udall v. Tallman.50 The Court’s invocation of the deference principle in Udall, 
however, was as categorical as it had been in Seminole Rock, seemingly confirming 
that the Court took the principle seriously. Reciting the “controlling weight” 
dictum, it added that “[w]hen the construction of an administrative regulation 
rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in order.”51 The 
Court posited that those who promulgated the regulation—that is, the regulators 
themselves—were those best positioned to offer authoritative insight into its 
 
 40. Id. at 417 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 
65 EMORY L.J. 47, 63 (2015) (noting the “unremarkable response to Seminole Rock” and explaining 
that “[i]n the aftermath of [the decision], there was no indication from scholars or the Court that a 
new doctrine of administrative law had just been announced”); Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Evasions, 16 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (2018) (noting that “commentators largely ignored the decision” when 
it was first announced). 
 43. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. 
 44. See id. It is true that the Court noted the Office of Price Administration’s bulletin was made 
available to manufacturers and was “uniformly . . . taken” and “consistent.” Id. at 417–18. But the 
Court made no attempt to explain how these factors meshed with its “controlling weight” dictum, as 
evidenced by the contemporary academic perplexity at the meaning of the case. See Kenneth Culp 
Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 597 (1950). 
 45. Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Lessons from the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 647, 658 (2015). 
 46. Davis, supra note 44, at 597. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 415–417 (1945). 
 49. Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 42, at 63. 
 50. 380 U.S. 1, 4, 16–17 (1965) (citing the Seminole Rock dictum to sustain the Secretary of 
Interior’s interpretation of an administrative regulation). 
 51. Id. at 16. 
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meaning.52 
In the succeeding years, the courts of appeals embraced and continued to 
expand this “strong” conception of Seminole Rock.53 The Supreme Court 
confronted the validity of this deference scheme in 1997, in the aforementioned 
case Auer v. Robbins.54 Auer concerned whether police sergeants and lieutenants 
qualified for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).55 The 
FLSA provided an exception from overtime pay for “bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional” employees, which the Secretary of Labor claimed 
the sergeants and lieutenants were under its “salary-basis test.”56 Essentially, 
employees would “be considered to be paid ‘on a salary basis’”—and thus ineligible 
for overtime—if their compensation was not subject to reduction for disciplinary 
infractions.57 The sergeants and lieutenants argued that they, at least technically, 
were subject to such reductions, even if desk duty or other non-salary penalties 
were more common.58 Citing his own interpretation of the regulation, the 
Secretary countered that such reductions had to be “significantly likely,” rather 
than just theoretically possible, to remove the officers from the exemption.59 
In a brief opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court ruled unanimously for 
the government.60 Justice Scalia faithfully recited the Seminole Rock dictum, 
indicating that because an agency interpretation of an agency regulation was at 
issue, that interpretation was, “under our jurisprudence, controlling unless 
‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”61 “That deferential 
standard,” he contended, was “easily met here.”62 Given the broad range of 
penalties potentially applicable to the officers’ conduct, the Secretary’s attempt to 
deduce which of those was a realistic possibility through a more empirical test was 
perfectly acceptable.63 
At the same time, however, the characteristic claim that Auer “mechanically . . 
. and reflexively” applied the Seminole Rock dictum64 tends to obscure a subtle 
change Auer introduced into the formulation. In Auer, the officers objected that 
the Secretary’s interpretation came to the Court “in the form of a legal brief.”65 
Justice Scalia argued that despite that fact, “[t]he Secretary’s position [was] in no 
 
 52. Id.; see also Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 42, at 80 (explaining how the Court’s 
unqualified endorsement of Seminole Rock deference in Udall “opened the door to broader deference 
in important ways”). 
 53. Pojanowski, supra note 30, at 89 n.10 (describing the D.C. Circuit’s approach from the 
1960s to the 1980s as “strong Seminole Rock doctrine”). 
 54. 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997) (endorsing the continued validity of Seminole Rock deference). 
 55. Id. at 455. 
 56. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.118(a) (1996)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 455, 462. 
 59. Id. at 461; see also id. at 455 (explaining the nature of the inquiry as whether “as a practical 
matter” the officers fell outside the test). 
 60. Id. at 454, 462–64. 
 61. Id. at 461 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 461–62. 
 64. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2429 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 65. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462. 
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sense a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n],’” and thus that the Secretary’s interpretation still 
qualified for deference.66 The implication of his statement was that had the 
Secretary’s interpretation constituted a post hoc rationalization, the Court would 
have shied away from deference. Thus, while reaffirming Seminole Rock, the Court 
mentioned and codified a qualification upon the doctrine—it was potentially 
inapplicable when the agency advanced after-the-fact interpretations to defend 
against litigation. This affirmation-with-modification approach inaugurated a 
trend that would persist through Kisor. 
Auer’s summary affirmance of Seminole Rock is often considered surprising, 
especially given the negative attention the newly christened “Auer deference” 
attracted from the legal academy in subsequent years.67 Scholars argued that Auer 
lacked a principled rationale, violated separation of powers, built in unfair bias 
toward government interpretations, and frustrated the APA’s requirement of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.68 Reflecting these concerns was the Court’s 
opinion in the transitional 2013 case Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.69 
Christopher, like Auer, concerned a Department of Labor (DOL) regulation; in this 
case, the proper construction of the term “outside salesman.”70 In previous 
litigation, the DOL took the position that an outside “sale” occurred when a 
salesman was involved in a “consummated transaction,” whether or not title 
actually transferred in the exchange.71 Yet at the Court, the DOL advanced the 
more restrictive position that only those who “actually transfer[red] title to the 
property at issue” qualified as “outside salesmen.”72 This new interpretation, 
which shrank the universe of “outside salesmen” exempt from certain FLSA wage 
and hour restrictions, concomitantly meant that their employers might now owe 
them significant backpay.73 
Sensing this potential unfairness, the Court restated the limitations upon, and 
indeed further constricted, the scope of Auer deference.74 Citing Auer, Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion noted that deference is “unwarranted when . . . the 
agency’s interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment 
on the matter in question.’”75 This might occur, as Auer itself mentioned, when 
the interpretation is simply “a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced . . . to defend 
past agency action against attack.”76 Reasoning from other cases, he also suggested 
deference was unwarranted when an “agency’s interpretation conflicts with a prior 
interpretation,” or when it appears to be “nothing more than a ‘convenient 
 
 66. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)). 
 67. See, e.g., Pojanowski, supra note 30, at 89, 89 nn.10–11. Indeed, much ink has been spilled 
in attempt to reconstruct Justice Scalia’s motivations for penning the decision he later dramatically 
disowned. Id. at 89–90. 
 68. Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 45, at 653–54. 
 69. 567 U.S. 142, 155–57 (2012). 
 70. Id. at 147. 
 71. Id. at 153–54. 
 72. Id. at 154. 
 73. Id. at 155–56. 
 74. Id. at 155, 159. 
 75. Id. at 155 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). 
 76. Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). 
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litigating position.’”77 To these qualifications, Justice Alito added another: 
deference was unwarranted if the interpretation engendered “unfair surprise” or 
unfairly retroactive penalties that regulated entities had “little reason to suspect.”78 
Given both the agency’s shifting position on its interpretation and the “potentially 
massive liability” the DOL’s new interpretation threatened to retroactively impose 
upon private industry, the majority declined to defer under Auer.79 
If Christopher suggested that cracks were accumulating in the Auer edifice, Kisor 
represented the doctrine on the brink of implosion. Kisor grew out of petitioner 
James Kisor’s application to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for disability 
benefits.80 Kisor, a Vietnam veteran, first applied for benefits in 1982, “alleging 
that he had developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his 
participation” in combat.81 The VA denied Kisor benefits after its psychiatrist 
concluded he “d[id] not suffer from PTSD.”82 In 2006, Kisor “moved to reopen 
his claim.”83 The VA reversed its position, concluding that Kisor did suffer from 
PTSD, but refused to retroactively compensate Kisor back to 1982.84 The Board 
of Veterans’ Appeals (the Board) upheld this denial, finding that it could only 
award benefits retroactively under VA regulations if it had failed to consider 
“‘relevant official service department records’ . . . in its initial denial.”85 Kisor had 
produced “two new service records . . . confirming his participation” in combat,86 
yet the Board considered these irrelevant because the reason for the initial denial 
was not that he had not participated in combat, but that he did not have PTSD.87 
In subsequent litigation over the denial, Kisor and the VA disputed each 
other’s interpretations of “relevant” evidence.88 In Kisor’s view, “relevant” 
evidence need not squarely rebut the basis of the prior denial; it was sufficient for 
such evidence to bear on the claim generally.89 In the government’s view, the 
evidence would have been “relevant” only if it rebutted the basis of the prior 
denial.90 Recognizing the ambiguity in the regulation, the Federal Circuit deferred 
to the government’s interpretation.91 Citing Seminole Rock, it found the agency’s 
stance neither “plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the VA’s regulatory 
framework,” and thus it deferred.92 In his petition for certiorari, Kisor asked the 
 
 77. Id. (first citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994); then quoting 
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)). 
 78. Id. at 156–57 (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007); 
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991); NLRB v. Bell 
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974)). 
 79. Id. at 155, 159. 
 80. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (alteration in original). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; see also Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing the Seminole Rock 
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Court to directly overrule the doctrines of Auer and Seminole Rock—the apparent 
basis for his loss below.93 
Before she weighed in on that request, Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court 
spent considerable energy restating, and in reality, further reconfiguring, the 
contours of Seminole Rock deference.94 In a section she casually referred to as “just 
background”95—a section a majority of the Court joined96—Justice Kagan 
introduced crucial new threshold questions designed to further constrict Seminole 
Rock.97 First was a modification of the ambiguity required in a regulation to invoke 
deference.98 The Court previously had been far from exacting in defining this 
ambiguity trigger, at one point suggesting jurists “need not tarry” over regulations’ 
language before invoking Seminole Rock.99 By contrast, Justice Kagan indicated that 
deference is now inappropriate “unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous.”100 
Further, courts should now assess “genuine ambiguity” with footnote 9 of 
Chevron,101 under which deference is appropriate only after “all the ‘traditional 
tools’ of construction” have failed to reveal a regulation’s meaning, leaving it 
intractably ambiguous.102 In his brief concurrence in the judgment, Justice 
Kavanaugh pointed out that if this new ambiguity trigger were to be “taken 
seriously,” it represents such a high bar that Seminole Rock deference should 
become relatively rare.103 
Second, Justice Kagan decisively rejected Seminole Rock’s formulation that 
courts must defer unless an agency’s interpretation of its own rule is “plainly 
erroneous.”104 Furthering the Chevron-Seminole Rock merger, she spurned the 
longstanding assumption that the plainly erroneous standard mandates greater 
deference than Chevron’s reasonableness standard.105 Though she argued that this 
assumption was an invention of the lower courts—citing a 2017 Sixth Circuit case 
as representative106—the Sixth Circuit had done no more than follow the Court’s 
own 1965 opinion in Udall, to the effect that deference to agency interpretations 
of agency regulations is “even more clearly in order” than deference to agency 
interpretations of statutes.107 Overruling Udall sub silentio, Justice Kagan dictated 
 
dictum). 
 93. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408. 
 94. Id. at 2410–18. 
 95. Id. at 2410. 
 96. Id. at 2407 (explaining that a majority of the Court joined Part II-B of Justice Kagan’s 
opinion). 
 97. Id. at 2415–16. 
 98. Id. at 2415 (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
 99. United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977). 
 100. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
 101. 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). 
 102. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). 
 103. Id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Formally rejecting Auer would have been a more 
direct approach, but rigorously applying footnote 9 should lead in most cases to the same general 
destination.”). 
 104. Id. at 2415–16 (majority opinion). 
 105. Id. at 2416. 
 106. Id. (citing Ohio Dep’t of Medicaid v. Price, 864 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2017)). 
 107. E.g., United States v. Midwest Suspension & Brake, 49 F.3d 1197, 1203 (6th Cir. 1995) 
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that the inquiry under Seminole Rock should now match that under Chevron: 
whether the agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous rule is within the range 
of permissible interpretations created by the ambiguity.108 
Third, to qualify for deference, Justice Kagan indicated that the agency’s 
interpretation must satisfy a “character and context” inquiry into whether it 
deserves “controlling weight.”109 Within this rubric, Justice Kagan blended 
familiar threshold questions—for instance, the Christopher factors—with other 
novel inquiries into whether application of deference in specific contexts would 
satisfy the doctrine’s purposes.110 Under the “‘authoritative’ or ‘official position’” 
inquiry, the agency’s interpretation must have some degree of authority and 
formality behind it to receive deference.111 Somewhat opaquely, Justice Kagan 
suggested that “[t]he interpretation must at the least emanate from those actors, 
using those vehicles, understood to make authoritative policy in the relevant 
context.”112 Thus, staff memoranda might qualify for deference, but an informal 
memorandum recounting a conversation might not.113 Further, under the 
“implicate[s] . . . substantive expertise” inquiry, the agency’s interpretation 
deserves deference only for those questions on which the agency might have some 
specialized insight.114 Referring to an example often invoked during the litigation, 
deference would be appropriate on such technical questions as whether a 
company creates “a new ‘active moiety’ by joining a previously approved moiety 
to lysine through a non-ester covalent bond.”115 By contrast, deference would now 
be inappropriate where the “interpretive issues . . . fall . . . into a judge’s bailiwick,” 
such as “a simple common-law property term,”116 or presumably, as in Kisor itself, 
whether evidence is relevant.117 Finally, bolted onto this superstructure were the 
factors compiled and restated in Christopher: whether the agency interpretation is 
a post hoc rationalization, whether it is simply a convenient litigating position, 
whether it conflicts with prior interpretations, and whether it would engender 
unfair surprise or retroactivity.118 
After this euphemistically framed “background” section, Justice Kagan turned 
to her arguments about stare decisis. One pillar of her argument was that Kisor 
had asked the Court to overturn not merely “a single case, but a ‘long line of 
precedents’—each one reaffirming the rest and going back 75 years or more.”119 
 
(citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965)). More specifically, it cited back to the Sixth 
Circuit’s line of cases that had adopted the Udall principle. Id. 
 108. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–16. 
 109. Id. at 2416. 
 110. Id. at 2416–18. 
 111. Id. at 2416 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257–59, 258 n.6 (2001) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566–67 nn.9–10 (1980)). 
 114. Id. at 2417. 
 115. Id. at 2410, 2417. 
 116. Id. at 2417. 
 117. See id. at 2417, 2423–24. 
 118. Id. at 2417–18; see Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–156 
(2012). 
 119. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 
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Her apparent view was that the deference regime she had sketched out in the 
preceding portions of her opinion bore an unbroken lineage back to Seminole 
Rock.120 Framed in that light, Kisor’s request to abandon the regime was radical, 
and thus, “stare decisis cut[] strongly against [his] position.”121 Those assertions 
notwithstanding, Part II explores why Justice Kagan’s arguments about stare 
decisis were weaker than they might first appear. 
II.  STARE DECISIS AND THE IDENTITY-OVER-TIME PROBLEM 
Whether the Constitution mandates stare decisis is controversial.122 Though 
Article III contains no explicit instruction that courts should abide by their own 
prior decisions, there are at least compelling prudential reasons to avoid 
precedential churn. To adjudicate whether these reasons—such as stability, 
reliance, and getting the law right—are compelling in individual cases, the Court 
has compiled a list of factors over the years to evaluate a precedent’s stare decisis 
weight.123 Those factors particularly relevant to the identity-over-time problem 
include: (1) the precedent’s age (its so-called “antiquity”); (2) the quality of the 
precedent’s reasoning; (3) the number of times the precedent has been reaffirmed; 
and (4) its workability.124 
Though the Court’s opinions have phrased each of these considerations as 
discrete factors, they are all intertwined. The driving assumption is that if a 
precedent has persisted over a long period, it must be meritorious; were it not, the 
Court would have seen fit to change or discard it in an intervening 
examination.125 Relatedly, an ancient precedent that has not been abandoned is 
presumably well-reasoned; otherwise, some revision eventually would have 
supplanted the precedent’s original logic.126 Regarding workability, that the Court 
has not seen fit to revise a precedent over the years is probative that it has not 
engendered practical problems.127 Finally, the number of times a precedent has 
been reaffirmed is often closely tied to both the quality of its reasoning—
presumably, it was reaffirmed because it made sense—as well as its age.128 The 
precedent could not have grown old had an intervening reexamination cast it 
aside. 
Each of these factors rests on a crucial implicit premise: that the Court, upon 
later reexaminations of precedent, is referring to the same precedent as was 
handed down at Time One. For example, it is obviously unjustified at Time Four 
 
(2014)). 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 
120 (2001) (discussing competing views but concluding that the historical evidence for an Article III 
stare decisis requirement is weak). 
 123. Justin W. Aimonetti, Second Guessing Double Jeopardy: The Stare Decisis Factors as Proxy Tools 
for Original Correctness, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 35, 39–40 (2020). 
 124. Id. at 51–52. 
 125. Id. at 52. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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to claim a precedent boasts an ancient lineage to Time One if the relevant 
principles actually originated at Times Two or Three. Nor, at Time Four, can the 
Court claim to be reaffirming the Time One precedent if the principles affirmed 
did not originate at Time One. Nor, at Time Four, can the Court say the Time 
One precedent has been twice “reaffirmed” if interim examinations at Times Two 
and Three fundamentally altered the Time One precedent. 
If one grants those basic premises, it becomes clear that the majority’s claim 
that Kisor asked the court to overrule “a ‘long line of precedents’—each one 
reaffirming the rest and going back 75 years or more”129 is indefensible. Imagine 
how the relevant history of Seminole Rock deference, discussed in Part I, would fit 
into a time sequence like that outlined in the Introduction: 
Time One: “Strong” Seminole Rock Deference 
(1) Seminole Rock, 1945: The Court announces that “the ultimate criterion is 
the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”130 The 
Court provides no explicit qualifications on this deferential standard. 
a. Udall, 1965: The Court reaffirms and arguably amplifies this 
standard, stating that deference to agency interpretations of their 
own regulations “is even more clearly in order” than deference to 
agency interpretations of statutes.131 
Time Two: Reaffirmation with a Caveat 
(1) Auer, 1997: The Court labels administrative interpretations as, “under 
our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.’”132 The Seminole Rock formulation survives. The 
Court considers “[t]hat deferential standard” “easily met” on the facts 
before it.133 
a. However, the Court indicates that such deference may be 
inappropriate where the agency interpretation is a “post hoc 
rationalizatio[n].”134 
Time Three: Cracks in the Edifice 
(1) Christopher, 2012: The Court indicates that “[a]lthough Auer ordinarily 
calls for deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous 
regulation,” it explains that “this general rule does not apply in all 
cases.”135 
a. Though deference is “undoubtedly inappropriate . . . when the 
agency’s interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
 
 129. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 
(2014)). 
 130. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
 131. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
 132. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 462 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
212 (1988)). 
 135. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012). 
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regulation,’” that the interpretation is not plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent no longer leads to automatic deference.136 
i. Rather, the agency’s interpretation only qualifies for deference 
if: 
1. The interpretation reflects “the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment on the matter in question”;137 
2. The interpretation is not simply a post hoc rationalization 
“advanced . . . to defend past agency action against 
attack”;138 
3. The interpretation does not conflict with prior 
interpretations;139 
4. The interpretation is not simply a “convenient litigating 
position”;140 and 
5. The interpretation does not engender unfair surprise or 
unfair retroactivity.141 
Time Four: A New Regime Emerges 
(1) Kisor, 2019: The Court abandons Seminole Rock’s formulation that the 
precedent receives “controlling weight” unless “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”142 Instead, the inquiry merges with 
Chevron. Reviewing courts now ask whether the agency’s interpretation 
was “reasonable”—that is, whether it was within the range of permissible 
interpretations created by the regulation’s ambiguity.143 As the Court 
acknowledges, “reasonableness” is a different inquiry than “plainly 
erroneous.”144 
a. To initiate the deference inquiry, the regulation must exhibit 
“genuine ambiguity.”145 That is, deference is potentially applicable 
only after judges have “exhaust[ed] all the ‘traditional tools’ of 
construction” and still find the ambiguity intractable.146 
i. Even assuming the regulation is intractably ambiguous and the 
agency’s interpretation falls within the range of permissible 
interpretations, deference is appropriate only if the agency’s 
interpretation satisfies the “character and context” inquiry.147 To 
that end, an agency seeking deference must show: 
 
 136. Id. (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461). 
 137. Id. (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)). 
 140. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)). 
 141. Id. at 155–56. 
 142. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–16 (2019) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
 143. Id. at 2416 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013)). 
 144. Id. at 2415–16. 
 145. Id. at 2415 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)). 
 146. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984)). 
 147. Id. at 2416 (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)). 
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1. The agency has put forward its authoritative or official 
position, instead of merely informal declarations;148 
2. The agency’s interpretation rests on its technical expertise 
and does not implicate a legal question susceptible to 
independent judicial resolution;149 
3. The interpretation is not simply a post hoc rationalization 
“advanced . . . to defend past agency action against 
attack”;150 
4. The interpretation does not conflict with prior 
interpretations;151 
5. The interpretation is not simply a “convenient litigating 
position”;152 and 
6. The interpretation does not engender unfair surprise or 
unfair retroactivity.153 
As the above sequence indicates, Kisor can hardly be said to reaffirm Seminole 
Rock. Justice Kagan’s “restatement” of the doctrine was—under a generous 
interpretation—a mere palimpsest, faintly recalling the Court’s wartime dictum 
while “enfeebl[ing]” it with novel conditions precedent.154 And even if an agency’s 
interpretation satisfies these new constraints, the end result is not the Court’s 
original “plainly erroneous” standard, but a modified, Chevron-style 
reasonableness review. Unlike the Athenians’ dutiful replacement of old planks 
with fresh facsimiles, Kisor’s rejiggering transformed the trireme into a rowboat. 
This loss of identity from Time One to Time Four, in turn, exposes the self-
contradictory nature of Justice Kagan’s invocation of stare decisis as a reason to 
affirm Seminole Rock. Stare decisis might have compelled retention of Seminole Rock 
if, for instance, the original precedent had been well-reasoned and had not 
suffered workability problems. Yet Kisor’s extensive modifications were a not-so-
tacit admission that Seminole Rock indeed had engendered practical problems and 
had not rested on sound thinking. Kisor itself exposed just one of these problems: 
the deference regime took the decidedly non-technical question of whether 
evidence was “relevant” in the context of a veteran’s claim for disability benefits 
out of the hands of an experienced federal judge and placed it into the grasp of a 
self-interested government agency.155 As everyone—Kisor, the United States, and 
all nine Justices—agreed, that fact revealed a defect in the regime that necessitated 
a modification.156 
Similarly, stare decisis would have been compelling had the Court actually 
reaffirmed Seminole Rock a number of times. Though Justice Kagan mentioned 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 2417. 
 150. Id. (citing Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155). 
 151. Id. at 2418 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)). 
 152. Id. at 2417 (citing Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155). 
 153. Id. at 2417–18 (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007)). 
 154. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 155. See id. at 2409 (majority opinion). 
 156. See id. at 2417, 2423–24. 
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“dozens of cases” in which the Court applied Seminole Rock,157 the Court did not 
consider whether to overrule the doctrine in all of them.158 And even in its 
purportedly routine applications, the Court had tacked on critical modifications 
to shore up newly discovered defects.159 These cases are self-evidently distinct from 
true reaffirmations of Seminole Rock’s basic points. They represent something 
closer to its gradual abandonment. 
If there were any doubt about that point, contrast Kisor with the decision the 
Court handed down nine days earlier in Gamble v. United States.160 In Gamble, the 
Court truly reaffirmed the 170-year-old dual sovereignty doctrine, permitting 
successive prosecutions by the federal and state governments for offenses over 
which both sovereigns have jurisdiction.161 That doctrine’s core point has 
persisted since 1847.162 Absent from Justice Alito’s majority opinion was the 
invention of new threshold inquiries and standards of review. That is a situation 
in which a precedent’s identity has persisted through “dozens of cases over 170 
years,” having survived different Courts, surrounding legal developments, and 
profound change to the outside world.163 That is a situation in which a precedent, 
unafflicted by the identity-over-time problem, carries great stare decisis force. 
Before turning to the broader jurisprudential significance of this identity-over-
time problem, a few words must be said about the potential level-of-generality 
objection lurking behind this Article’s criticism of the majority’s reasoning. 
Defenders of Justice Kagan might assert that identity over time becomes an issue 
only if we assume a “precedent” must be defined at a relatively low level of 
generality. If we contrast Kisor with Seminole Rock at the level of precise verbal 
formulations, perhaps doing so ignores the general notion persisting through each 
that courts in some instances should defer to agencies’ interpretations of their 
ambiguous regulations. If framed at that level of abstraction, there might seem to 
be a more colorable claim of continuity over time. 
The response is that to envision a general interpretive principle as a “precedent” 
deserving stare decisis weight is to mistake the basic nature of a precedent. 
Precedents necessarily exist at a low level of generality. They are a combination of 
(1) the result reached; (2) the facts of a particular case; and (3) the reasoning by 
which the Court reached it. The result’s relevance is obvious; it is the basis for the 
Court’s investigation into the reliance on and practical effects of its holding.164 
Though commentators once spoke as if the rationale behind those results were 
irrelevant for purposes of gauging stare decisis weight,165 that claim is now patently 
 
 157. Id. at 2422. 
 158. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597 (2013); see also id. at 616–17 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority’s refusal to “reconsider 
Auer”). 
 159. See supra Part I. 
 160. 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). 
 161. Id. at 1964. 
 162. Id. at 1966. 
 163. Id. at 1969. 
 164. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992); Aimonetti, supra 
note 123, at 40–41. 
 165. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It and When Do 
We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 607 (1990) (“[A] case is important only for what it decides . . . . 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
220 SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 73:204 
out of step with the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court examines not only a 
precedent’s real-world impact but also “the quality of its reasoning.”166 Indeed, 
the Court is clear that it will accord prior cases significantly less weight to the 
extent they are “ill founded”167 or “poorly reasoned.”168 Moreover, a case’s 
precedential weight necessarily depends upon its specific facts.169 If a subsequent 
case presents a factual scenario incongruous with the precedent, as every lawyer 
knows, it may be distinguished away on those factual grounds. Precedential force, 
then, arises out of the specific combination of a case’s facts, its reasoning, and its 
result. 
Yet by the time the majority reached its stare decisis arguments in Kisor, the 
Court had already so vigorously shaken the Seminole Rock Etch-a-Sketch that much 
of that original case’s specific contours had been lost to history. The deference 
principle had shifted from the dictate of a discrete case and toward an interpretive 
default rule from the judicial common law of administrative law.170 That fact is 
revealed not only by a historical account of the doctrine’s development but also 
by the Court’s implementation of the doctrine in the intervening decades. Indeed, 
one study of the Court’s cases revealed that “none of the Justices” treated Seminole 
Rock “as [a] mandatory precedent[] binding as a matter of stare decisis.”171 Seminole 
Rock’s rule had, instead, melted into a “flexible rule[] of thumb or presumption[] 
deployed by the Justices episodically and not entirely predictably.”172 It had 
receded from the specific to the general, from the precedential to the prudential, 
becoming less like a case and more like a canon of construction; a tool in the 
toolbox rather than a determinate directive subject to stare decisis. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For all Kisor’s significance to the administrative state, it is ultimately a classic 
“low salience” case.173 Unlike abortions, guns, and gay rights, Kisor failed to 
engender political controversy beyond legal circles,174 and its broader policy 
ramifications outside administrative law will likely be similarly muted. Yet a case 
 
[T]he later court is not bound by the statement of reasons, or dictis, set forth in the rationale.”). 
 166. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019); Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cnty., 
& Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2479 (2018). 
 167. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 168. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479. 
 169. Aldisert, supra note 165, at 605. 
 170. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2444 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that Auer 
had come to represent an “interpretive methodology” rather than “a precedent that purported to 
settle the meaning of a single statute”). 
 171. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical 
Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1759 (2010) 
(emphasis added). 
 172. Id. at 1766. 
 173. See Isaac Unah & Angie-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Case Salience, 
and the Attitudinal Model, 28 L. & POL’Y 295, 297–98 (2006). 
 174. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Why the Supreme Court’s Rulings Have Profound Implications for 
American Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/supreme-
court-gerrymandering-census.html [https://perma.cc/GLK3-VUBY]. For instance, a New York Times 
editorial published the day after Kisor’s announcement failed to mention the case, focusing instead 
on gerrymandering decisions. Id. 
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like Kisor can elicit seventy-five pages of opinion from four Justices precisely 
because it is, in part, a proxy war about the stability of those high-salience 
precedents. This concern has only sharpened among the liberal Justices in light of 
the Court’s recent personnel changes. Justice Kagan has “sound[ed the] alarm on 
precedent” in the popular sphere,175 prompting Professor Steve Vladeck to suggest 
the present low-salience debates over stare decisis presage an “even bigger case 
where the dispute is front and center.”176 
The subtext of these remarks, particularly in light of the Court’s recent 
agreement to reexamine certain aspects of its abortion jurisprudence, is the vitality 
of Roe v. Wade.177 Justice Breyer suggested as much in a recent dissent from the 
Court’s opinion overturning a thirty-year-old precedent concerning state 
sovereign immunity.178 “Today’s decision,” he concluded, “can only cause one to 
wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.”179 This penultimate line of his 
opinion followed his citation, two sentences before, of Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.180 “[C]ould this landmark,” his opinion left commentators to speculate, 
now “be struck down?”181 
That much is for the Justices to decide. What is certain, however, is that Kisor’s 
Kagan-Gorsuch debate exposed yet another hurdle precedents must overcome to 
survive—the identity-over-time problem. As this Article has argued, modifications 
to precedents’ rules182 and reasoning183 are not assets. They are conspicuous 
liabilities. Such judicial tinkering betrays the original case’s failures of workability 
and the defects latent in its reasoning. And the façade of antiquity will fall away 
from many supposedly ancient precedents on a more rigorous examination. Their 
stare decisis weight should wither accordingly. 
 
 175. Ariane de Vogue, Elena Kagan Becomes Latest Liberal Justice to Sound Alarm on Precedent, CNN 
(June 21, 2019, 9:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/21/politics/kagan-supreme-court-
precedent-warning/index.html [https://perma.cc/5936-6D8V]. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) (overruling Nevada v. Hall, 440 
U.S. 410 (1979)). 
 179. Id. at 1506 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. 
 181. AJ Willingham, The Supreme Court Has Overturned More than 200 of Its Own Decisions. Here’s 
What It Could Mean for Roe v. Wade, CNN (May 29, 2019, 7:31 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/29/politics/supreme-court-cases-overturned-history-constitution-
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